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GRANTS OF EASEMENTS AND ESTATES DISTINGUISHED:
ALIENABILITY OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
In re Wyatt's Claim
74 Ohio L. ribs. 450, 141 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio Zpp. 1955)
In November 1901, J. B. Wyatt executed to the Western Ohio
Railway Company a warranty deed to a strip of land which was part
of a 90 acre tract held in fee by the grantor. A condition in the deed
provided that if the grantee failed to use the premises for railway
purposes, "the estate hereby granted [Emphasis Added] . . . shall
cease and determine and the title . . . shall revert . . . [to] the
grantor [,] his.heirs and assigns without further act or deed." In March
1902, J. B. Wyatt conveyed the fee in the 90 acre tract by warranty
deed to John H. and J. D. Barnes and the grant excepted "the right
and title of the Western Ohio Railway Company' . . ." In 1932
the Railway Company forfeited its interest in the strip of land and
the owners of the 90 acre tract treated the strip of land as their own.'
However, when the Department of Highways appropriated the land
for public use, the sole devisee of J. B. Wyatt's estate asserted ownership
and claimed the proceeds' of the appropriation. The court of appeals
found that the deed to the Railway Company conveyed only a "limited
title to a right of way or an easement" and that the deed of the 90
acre tract divested the grantor of all interest in the premises.
Relatively little difficulty should be encountered in distinguishing
between a fee simple determinable and an easement, but the importance
of such a distinction cannot be overemphasized. Consideration will be
given, herein to the method of distinguishing between the grant of an
easement and that of a fee simple determinable, the importance of the
distinction with respect to division of property rights in the land, and the
related problem of alienation of the future interest resulting from the
creation of a fee simple determinable.
The court failed to distinguish between an easement and a fee
simple determinable and other courts have displayed difficulty in similar
conveyances. 2 Indeed, some courts have stated flatly that the grant of a
strip of land for railway purposes conveys only an easement even though
the instrument purports to convey an estate in fee.3 Some real property
authorities have contended that as a result of the Statute Quia Emptores
it is impossible to create a fee simple determinable,4 but the fact remains
1The facts do not indicate that the doctrine of adverse possession was
applicable and no consideration will be given to that issue.
2 Annot., 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941).
3E.g., Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 81 Pac. 208 (1905); supra
note 2.
4 See Powell, Determinable Fees, 23 COLUM. L. Rav. 207 (1923) and Vance,
Rights of Reverter and the Statute Quia Emptores, 36 YALE L. REv. 593 (1927).
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that most jurisdictions, including Ohio, have recognized such estates.5
The Ohio Supreme Court indicated a guide for distinguishing
between the grant of an easement and that of an estate in fee in
Hinman v. Barnes6 which involved an instrument entitled "CONTRACT
FOR RIGHT OF WAY" and granted a strip of land "to be used as a
perpetual right of way for railroad purposes only." The court said,
cc... nothing further appearing than that the granting clause ...refers
to 'land,' a fee is . . .conveyed; and . . .where the granting clause
refers only to a 'right,' such an instrument *conveys only an easement."
The court then pointed out that if an examination of the whole instru-
ment indicated a contrary intent, such intent would be given effect.
Relying on the reference to a right of way in the tide and the limitation
in the granting clause the court held that an easement was conveyed.
Thus it would appear that if the instrument is ambigious, i.e., refers
sometimes to "right" and other times to "land," the struggle for the
intention of the parties begins, but when there is reference only to
"right" or only to "land," then an easement or an estate in fee is
conveyed. The deed in the instant case to the Railway Company was
unambigious, the reference was always to land, i.e., premises or estate.
While the court in the Hinman case referred to the distinction
between a fee and an easement, the reasoning is clearly applicable in the
principal case because the vital distinction is between an easement and
an estate. The Restatement of Property provides:
An estate in fee simple determinable is created by any limitation
which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land, (a)
creates an estate in fee simple; and (b) provides that the
estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated
event.
7
Since the deed to the Railway Company by the terms of the granting
clause purported to create an estate in fee 'but further provided that
"the estate ...shall revert . .. [to] the grantor" if the premises were
not used for railway purposes, the Restatement definition of a fee simple
determinable is satisfied. Presumably the Cops Chapel' doctrine is not
applicable. In that case a conveyance which met the requirements of the
Restatement definition was held to convey an estate in fee because there
was no express provision for a reverter to the grantor upon occurrence of
the condition. 9
r5 SiUMES AND SMITH, THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTERESTS §283 (2d ed. 1956);
Bartholomew v. Rothrock, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 513 (Ohio App. 1935).
6 146 Ohio St. 497, 66 N.E.2d 911 (1946).
7 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §44 (1936).
8 In re Matter of Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St.
309, 166 N.E. 218 (1929).
9 Bartholomew v. Rothrock, supra note 5, where the court found a fee simple
determinable relying on the presence of a reverter clause to distinguish the Copps
Chapel case. See Miller v. Village of Brookville, 152 Ohio St. 217, 89 N.E.2d 85
(1949) where the court emphasized the absence of a reverter clause in holding
that a fee simple determinable was not conveyed.
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Comparing the definition of an easement with that of the fee simple
determinable will serve to point out the 'differences in the rights of the
grantor and grantee under the two interests. The Ohio Supreme Court
has described an easement as follows:
An easement implies necessarily a fee in another, and it follows
that it is a right ... to use the land for a special purpose, and
one not inconsistent with the general property in the land of
the owner of the fee..._.1°
The owner of an easement can enjoy only the rights covered by the
easement, while the owner of a fee simple determinable enjoys all the
rights of an owner in fee until the determining condition occurs. Thus,
when oil is discovered, tje owner of a fee simple determinable is entitled
to drill and remove the oil'" whereas the owner of an easement would
have no right to the oil.'"
Another important reason for making the distinction is the necessity
that rules of construction developed by the courts for determining the
intention of the grantor in a deed be uniformly applied in order to
insure maximum stability of real property interests. In the absence of
ambiguity certain phraseology in a deed results in the grant of a certain
property interest and deeds are drafted in light of such guides.
The importance of proper application of rules of construction is
also emphasized by the fact that had the court found that the deed to
the Railway Company created a fee simple determinable, the question
of alienation of the possibility of reverter' 3 would have arisen and the
determination of this issue may have commanded a different result.
The deed of the 90 acre tract purported to convey the entire interest
of the grantor which would have included his possibility of reverter.
However, at common law this interest has generally been held to be
inalienable apparently on the theory that the rich and powerful would
acquire such future interests and use them to usurp the interests of the
poor before the right accrued. 4 The real property authorities and most
courts have recognized that the danger is no longer real, 15 but the
10 Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. v. Wachter, 70 Ohio St. 113, 70 N.E. 974 (1904).
11 Cf. Brightwell v. International-Great Nor. Ry. 121 Tex. 338, 49 SAV.2d
437, 84 A.L.R. 265 (1932).
12 Cf. Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105, 132 S.W.2d 768, 132
A.L.R. 137 (1939).
13 Possibility of reverter has been defined as "any reversionary interest which
is subject to a condition precedent." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §154(3) (1936).
14 "Under color thereof pretended titles might be granted to great men,
whereby right might be trodden down, and the weak oppressed, which the common
law forbiddeth, as men to grant before they be in possession." COKE UPON
LITTLETON §347.
15See e.g., SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §1860 (2d ed.
1956) and Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-
Entry, 22 B.U.L. 'Rev. 43 (1942) ; Jeffers v. Lampson, 10 Ohio St. 101, 108 (1859)
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change in most jurisdictions has awaited legislative action to abrogate
the prohibition on alienation.'
6
Although there has been no decision on the validity of an inter
vivos transfer of a possibility of reverter in Ohio, the interest has been
held not to be devisable. 1" It would seem to follow that the outmoded
reasoning would apply to an inter vivos transfer as well. Recent common
law decisions concerning the issue as an original proposition in other
jurisdictions are conflicting. Relying on the modern tendency towards
liberal alienation of property interests, the Texas Commission of Appeals
upheld the transfer of a possibility of reverter,"s while, on the other
hand, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that the change of the
common law rule must come from the legislature, 9 and held that the
possibility of reverter could not be alienated. The Minnesota decision
would seem to be particularly susceptible to attack. Since the reason for
the rule has disappeared, the only persons who can be adversely effected
by its abrogation are the grantors of such interests. It seems clear that
the grantor should not be entitled to the benefit of a meaningless rule
in order to defeat his own grant.
An Ohio statute, although not in effect at the time of the grant
of the possibility of reverter in the Wyatt case, must nonetheless be
considered in connection with the problem of alienation of a possibility
of reverter. It provides as follows:
Remainders, whether vested or contingent, executory interests
and other expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alien-
able in the same manner as estates in possession.
2 0
It seems clear that a possibility of reverter is included in the term
"expectant estates" but the New York Court of Appeals in construing a
similar statute held to the contrary on the ground that a possibility of
reverter is a "mere expectancy."'" The decision has been criticized"2 but
the New York Court of Appeals recently held in a case in which the
deed was substantially the same as the one to the Railway Company in
where the court referring to the reason behind the rule said in dictum, ". . in a
state of society presenting strongly marked classes, with great inequality of civil
rights, and of social rank and consequent influence, and where legal proceedings
were very expensive to parties litigant, the rule may have been wise and salutary;
but in this age and country, of complete civil and comparative social equality,
and of cheap justice, where champerty and maintenance are obsolete offenses,
quere-has not the reason of the rule ceased? And ought not the rule itself to
disappear with the reason on which it rests?"
16 See RESrATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936), special note p. 588, where the various
statutes of the different states are set forth.
17 Bartholomew v. Rothrock, supra note 5.
18 Caruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.AV. 779 (Tex. Com. App. 1923).
19 Consolidated School District No. 102 v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159, 66 N.W.2d
881 (1954).
2
o) OH REV. CODE §2131.04 (1953).
21 Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896).
22 SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §1903 (2d ed. 1956).
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the Wyatt case that the grantee railroad company received a fee simple
determinable and the subsequent grant of the possibility of reverter was
invalid.2" Fortunately, most jurisdictions have taken a more liberal view
of such statutes. Presumably the fact that the New York statute24 is
not as comprehensive as the Ohio statute and was construed prior to
the widespread enactment of legislation 21 indicating the trend towards
liberal alienation mitigates the persuasiveness of the Upington case.
It seems obvious that the Ohio legislature intended to make possible the
alienation of all real property interests where the sole argument against
alienation is champerty and maintenance and presumably the Ohio courts
will reflect that intent when the issue is presented.
L. L. Inscore
23 Lipetz v. Papish, 308 N.Y. 787, 125 N.E.2d 432 (1955).
24"An expectant estate is descendible, devisable and alienable, in the same
manner as an estate in possession." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw. §59.
25 Supra note 16.
